The political reality at present
Trump said that immigrants to the USA are “poisoning the blood of our country”. People other than Trump are against uncontrolled, illegal immigration for much better reasons than blood-poisoning, thus seemingly more nuanced and less obtuse in the process of bringing across their own opinions in the political debate. Whoever enters a novel country but goes “under the rader” is not subjected to public requirements to internalize their new home culture.
The feeling among many Trump voters may possibly be that illegal immigrants arrive and might eventually win their right to vote (if naturalized as an act of absolution) without acquiring as deep an understanding of the US system as legal immigrants. They may fear that future voter behaviour will no longer reflect the national sovereignty of the known and loved american culture with ideals of self-responsibility, showing your true colors in openly in the public, and that advantages can be responsibly given solely through respect for the law? They may also feel that absolving those who have presently entered the USA against the law, will encourage others to lay out on the same path.
Most of the illegal immigration comes from the spanish-speaking Americas. The majority of hispanic US citizens who are eligible voters vote for the democratic party, and it might be that Trump voters perceive them as voting collectively for the democratic party, and thus group based; collectively rather than individualistically) and as such for the “progressive” of the available alternatives.
If those who have immigrated illegally should be given the same rights to vote, they could be thought bound by loyalty to the democratic party who has aided their struggle, even though they may not have used the english language as their first or having paid taxes, and without guarantees that they would not also have voted more left leaning if given such electable alternatives.
Trump voters may feel that it is increasingly little transparent what political viewpoints actually incubate in the democratic party. They may also think that this results in liberal policies that create increased immigration of future voters for the democratic party, threatening to create a future “one party state” of the democratic party, at best.
Furthermore, their feeling may be that this could become a threat to the shape and texture of the old, bipartisan American democracy and thereby also to the sovereignty of the known and loved US-American culture. Many Trump voters may now feel they need to vote for Trump (cf. for his promises to save the country) as a counteract “before it is too late”.
This may indeed mainly be a counteract, and not because they prefer to vote identity-group based and collectively, or because they a priori want to discredit the old-school democrats’ trustworthiness to co-govern a common democracy as though a republican one party state (a non-democracy) would be more desireable.
The democrats‘ tolerance of (cf. apologetic attitude towards) illegal immigration can be seen by republican voters as the democrats setting either their own liberal feelings (cf. their unilateral subjectivity) or a lethargic will to fight for the countrys laws above the commonly owned laws and political system when they get to be in charge or power (cf. not intersubjectively). If feelings are to have any place in politics, it cannot be at the expence of commonly shared laws. Otherwise, the laws in the context of a bipartisan democracy cannot be trusted and are no longer paramount to defend to secure one’s own interests relative to those of others.
Standing up for your own feelings more than for commonly shared laws when in power, in fact resembles an alpha-like reliance on informal authority cursors, without hereby claiming this is what most old-school democrats have done. However, republican voters may rightfulle sense: A country that signals that it either cannot or does not want to enforce its own laws may be headed for demise, at the very least being little trustworthy for its own citizens in terms of its ability to protect their sovereignty as a culture and as a nation.
The feelings and/or the lethargic will of one part cannot trump co-owned laws and systems if one expects to indefinately continue a healthy, well-functioning co-ownership of a bipartisan democracy. That is a decadent form of “arrogance-in-power”, maybe a sign of an easily planted sensation of ownership and presumptious sovereignty-expectations. It can actually be sensed as a threath to democracy, making sense to the slogan “we are losing our country” graspable.
The constitution of western countries (The USA and “the rest of the west” alike) have only taken hight for the need of a strong governments with all necessary powers to “cut through” in the case of external threats from other states, where the state of war is defined as a justified state of emergency passingly permissing autoritarian means as something accepted by the public.
Situations that “we” (in all western countries) have been spared of thus far may arise, however, in which an equally strong executive leadership with the ability to “cut through” is needed due to a domestic crisis. Such crises may be imaginable if all mainstream parties distrust the other mainstream parties to abide by a shared constitution.
If that is how the problem is defined, however, which party could be entrusted to wield the powers to declare and execute a state of emergency? The answer is “none”! The executive branch of government, who wields the power to declare a state of emergency and who commands the loyality of the military, can only represent one of those parties gravely distrusting each other at a time. That distrust, however, is what defines the crisis in the first place.
If no party trusts the other parties to respect the constitution enough to be worthy of wielding emergency-declaring powers because they think it can be used to supress their equal status within democracy, we get close to seeing the slowly emerging danger today’s american democracy might be facing. Both parties may sense: “If the other party supresses us by twisting the truth and hence also the constitution, fighting that party – passingly – becomes more important than the constitution, because otherwise our part in that same democracy as defined by that same constitution might be over”.
To the political opposition, it may always seem as though a party in charge of executive power uses its power to declare emergency politically (in a politicizing manner). Western democracies seem to have little immune system for this type of domestic crisis by means of their constitutions. In a worst case, hypothetically, there can be a scenario be a civil war where both sides claim to defend the constitution, and both break it.
Both sides may end up fighting with dishonest (cf. in effect unconstitutional and self-contradictory) means to ensure that they wield the executive power, or at least that the others do not. The risk to the very future may be perceived too great not to do so, so both parts describe reality differently and self-servingly, just like most often the case when different nations go to war towards one another.
Differently now than in the 19th century, however, it is not a given that the USA can even affort a civil war. National security towards possible threats from other, present and future superpowers is granted because of its status as a nuclear superpower. A civil war of the 21th century would put that status in jeopardy. If the integrity of the nuclear arsenal is retained and in american hands after a civil war, that will be pure luck. Civil war parties may fight for control over the nuclear arsenal, and the nuclear weapons may get used or lost to the black world market. Foreign enemies may attack while the USA is “lying down”.
If both mainstream parties fear that it may be the last presidential election ever if the opponents win the next, conflict seems to be the next step, even though not all conflicts must turn warm. Fears that the next election may be the last one might seem exaggerated and unrealistic at present, concerning the 2024 presidential election, but some have articulated it. Democracy, at least seem to those who claim that in all seriousness, to be so threatened as to potentially die.
Is the value of democracy‘s own “autonomy” so absolute that its right to die on its own terms must rank above that of a “suspending hand” (a declared state of emergency to rework the constitution into something both parties agree to trust), obliged to suspend only when necessary to recreate and save democracy? With the present day constitution in hand, such a type of state of emergency only be declared on a bipartisan basis, if at all. The legislative would probably have to take an active role, whereas the powers to declare a state of emergency normally rests with the executive. That a president fighting for true national unity is elected, seems unlikely with the present candidates.
What changes to the constitution are apt and necessary is premature to say. The best heads in the USA (cf. maybe in the world’s best heads) would need to get together, like the founding fathers of the USA 247 years ago. Part of a state of emergency declared on a bipartisan base – could – be to voluntarily invite australian election observers for the duration of the declared structural emergency (americans’ trust in british ones may be compromized by connotations of colonial history, canadian ones may be seen by americans as potentially too vested in neighborly interests).
Since some years, you get stories from America about neighbours who no longer greet each other on the street because they vote for the other, old-traditional and mainstream US party. It didn’t use to be like that in the United States of America as late as a decade or two ago. It is sometning new. That makes it worth reminding of this:
“The surest way to corrupt a youth is to instruct him to hold in higher esteem those who think alike than those who think differently“. (Nietzsche, 1881: The Dawn of Day, book 4, #297)
Traditional US culture has had as a natural, intrinsic element to respect political differences within the mainstream political landscape. That respect has meant that the political differences has not interfered with authentically friendly socializing across party boundaries. That is what real national unity means as long as democracy is what we talk about. The traditionally protestant part of Europe still has it.
Intersubjectivity, in politics between parties just like between people too, means respectfully listening and taking into account, seeking fair (novel, development-facilitating) solutions or until then, respectfully agreeing to disagree. As a subjective statement, only the parties leaning directly towards the center position of the democratic, political spectrum seem able to do this. Correct that if wrong! In a healthy democracy the biggest so called mainstream parties lean towards the center position from each side.
In the USA, both mainstream parties may have become incubated with more far wing elements. That may be what has hurt the ability to relate intersubjectively across party boundaries. Maybe there is a need for the old-school fractions of both old-traditional, mainstream parties to claim back their control over their parties from the more novel far-wing, “undercover” fractions that has been able to hide among them without showing their true colors.
The mainstream parties could chose to say to themselves: “We won‘t let our old party’s traditional agenda be couped and altered. We may passingly shrink, but we will not remain big by changing who we are. If you cannot accept that, we will force you out and you may then be free to found your own party of your own liking”.
That way, it will be both more transparent and more predictable what the mainstream parties represent, and both mainstream parties will be more etable for the mainstream portion of the other one. Democrats need to understand (full understanding makes the need for forgiving obsolete) those “old-schoolers” who have kept voting republican despite of Trump. Republicans need to understand (full understanding makes the need for forgiving obsolete) those “old-schoolers” who have kept voting democratic despite of others’ dire sense of a national emergency.
Maybe the old-school democrats will then realize the necessity of respecting their opponents’ calls for the country’s laws to be upheld strictly, in order to make possible a reborn national unity together with with old-school republicans. They may or may not find it important on their own accord, but if old-school democrats value the past, now potential, national unity with old-school republicans, they may realize that laws are the first pragmatic principle of functioning democracy, and that national unity may not be possible to restore without a full respect of their meaning.
Trump‘s “buzzing” can be ignored, but not thereby also the mainstream republican mindset because of him. That would be a – huge – anti-american mistake. It is possible to imagine a bi-partisan decision to declare a political state of emergency before the front lines of a domestic conflict have become too rigid to make it possible.
If there is national unity, the political center cursored by cross-party intersubjectivity can ally and unite, against degrees of radicalism and extremism on both flanks. The left half of that political center of civil national unity is what the radicalist Trump in effect calumniates and threatens to oppress. The political center is still made up of a left and a right half, and the center holds only if it has a majority size when combined. The bigger the crisis, however, the bigger the far wing flanks. That is why a bipartisan state of emergency could be declared – ASAP.
If a party winning elections are very “we-oriented” in their rhetoric about national unity, it may seem to opponents as an attempt to create a national “we” that is uni-partisan but nevertheless expected to include the opponents (cf. “national unity won because we won”). That does not seem constructive. It is in fact a collective, political equivalent to an “I-based we” if seen among individuals.
The only “we” that can exist reflecting actual national unity, is one that is more loosely defined and fully co-defined, nothing a winning party should brag about on election night. It is a more silent but true “we” that can persist despite retaining as normality a considerable human distance, emotional cool, disagreement and real differences of mindset. It is a “we” in line with individualism.
Feeling belongingness to such a “we” boils down to being a chosen attitude, and one that does not want to be forced, least of all by the hand of opponents. The value of a united America that presidential candidates and winners mostly talk about, may more preferably refer to such a looser, freer “we”, nothing like “now we will show everyone how we are all going to change”.
The members of a looser, freer “we” corresponding to sustainable national unity, are not those who love that unity the most exuberantly or expressedly, but those who see the advantages of such a loose, free “we” over all thinkably realistic alternatives. A “we” of actual equality, rooted in true, equal, toned down intersubjectivity and actual individualism. The most fundamental cornerstone of such a “we” is mutual trust that all mainstream political position will respect the rules of democracy to the same degree. That is why far wing fractions within mainstream parties could be banished from the mainstream parties, to form their own.
Such a looser, freer “we” does exist also in the USA. It is the “drowned out” and partially “overridden” remnants of the mutually respectful, bipartisan democracy the USA as a rule has been before. It is still the same, good-natured old America with a down to earth type of peace of mind, the more self-confident “backbone of America” who dares trust fate rather than to alter their nature into something lesser to save it.
Will the United States, after Trump, be able to move back to a more soft-spoken, sober, listening, factual, objectiveness-seeking, and mutually respectful political culture? They did use to have it before him. Europeans who grew up in the 80s, 90s and even the 00s remember that America, and the way the republican mindset was an unquestionable part of it. That admired, power- and successful nation may have kept the center position of western european democracies a bit further to the right than it would have otherwise been.
Why is Trump not like those old-school republicans. Well, he simply is not an old-school, center-leaning republican. He is more far wing, and his lack of intersubjectivity is a symptom of it. It is thinkable that a sense of emergency may have let many americans overlook it, because his staunch promises to protect and handle America’s challenges more resolutely and more successfully than anyone else has been permissed under the flag of the old-traditional and mainstream republican party, and thus to profit from its respectability.
The true reason he himself thinks he will resolve the nation’s crisis so uniquely sovereignly, is likely because he wants to do so uniquely differently. When he talks about ultimate vindication and ultimate rewards, that is indicative of how Trump’s “different way” makes him politically un-american. He as a person, will let the USA achieve something the world’s leading country hasn‘t without him. A light source can be made more effective if all beams point the same way like a lazer. That cannot be done without collectivist morals and/or means of coercion. His way equals trying to save something beloved by means which changes that which one loves into something lesser.
On the 13.07.2024 Trump nearly got killed by a lone would-be-assassin. Murder and attempted murder is, needless to say, uncondonable. Long live the human being Donald Trump! Longer still live the freedom of America! If the freedom of America cannot be maintained despite of Trump as a re-elected president, the country is not ressillient enough against its own loss of freedom and carries the responsibility for that itself, not Trump. We don’t want to aggrandize him.
Soon after the assassination attempt, Trump’s soon to be running mate James David Vance stated that a premis of the Biden-campaign had been that Trump was an authoritarian fascist, and that this made them directly responsible for the attempted assassination. If Biden has called Trump a facist, that would be a failure of judgement. If so you have to give Vance partly right. How would that be better than Trump calling opponents marxist?
It is retrievable that Biden has called Trump and the political philosophy he uses a “semi-fascist”. Those pro Biden could attempt an argument that the distance between “mainstream democrat” and “marxist” is bigger than between “MAGA-republican alpha” and “semi-fascist”, but who are they to expect republican voters fearing to lose their country because they honestly think democrats set their feelings before the commonly shared laws to see such a statement as anything other than self-serving argumentation and empty, meaningless rhetorics?
It is so, however, that if you honestly do not manage to interpret Trump in a different manner than as a threat to healthy, well-functioning democracy, a democracy must allow also that opinion to be aired openly, without having those outing themselves about it being made co-responsible for other people’s attempted murder. As to Vance’s statement, individualism implies among other things that all people carry the full responsibility for their own, criminal acts (although direct og clearly indirect encouragement/abetting may give degrees of co-responsibility).
More deeply unforunate, thus, was a statement by Biden a short time before the incident, where he said he wanted to put Trump in “the bull’s eye” (cf. in the rifle scope). Biden’s “bull‘s eye-statement” is possible to interpret charitibly. The bull’s eye-expression has sufficiently strong figurative meaning (Biden wanted to direct a stronger critical focus onto Trump – something the assassination attempt made it more difficult to do afterwards) that it is feasible that Biden in fluid speech at a banquet overlooked that it may also be taken as an indirect encouragement of violence (cf. it is not a clear, indirect encouragement).
It would in no way excuse the assassination attempt, but Trump has allegedly stated that there may be bloodbath if he doesn’t win in November. How is that better than Biden’s “bull’s eye statement”? We should try to interpret Trumps statement as charitably as possible too (noe double standards). Trump said that at a meeting with auto-manufacturers. It is more than just plausible that he meant there would be an economical blood bath to the auto industry if he didn’t become president. It was not abetting violence and overthrow of democracy. Maybe the would-be-assassin had only heard the bloodbath-quote devoid of its context, however, and took it litterary? The type of violence-connoting rhetoric both Trump and Biden here used is not really the most healthy to democracy.
Maybe, however, the would-be-assassin had independently gathered information about Trump’s clear, indirect threats towards the daughter of a judge, about the storming of Congress, about his quote of immigrants poisoning the blood of the country, about Trumps plan to punish and curtail the free press, to politicize the crime fighting justice department as a weapon to indict marxist judges who arent marxist, about Trumps stamping of Biden as the alleged mirror image of the marxist Sovjet-despot Stalin, about him calling critics vermin – and – all of this in the frame of multiple criminal convictions and seemingly winning support through lies/fake news/propaganda.
Trump said shortly after the attempt on his life: “fight, fight, fight” and “do not allow evil to win”. It could almost sound as though he here wanted to bring across that if his political opponent wins the 2024 presidential election, the like-minded of the republican registered would-be-assassin would next govern the country and threaten the nation as a big evil. The attempted assassination, after all, was the back carpet of him making those statements.
It could be that the statements were given in a state of shock, men Trump didn’t seem to be in a state of shock, and the statements echoed faithfully ones he had given over a long period of time allready before the incidence. What in specific is this evil, that one needs to “fight, fight, fight”? Like-minded individuals of the republican-registered would-be-assassin? Electoral fraud? Stalinistic show trials?
It seems diffuse, the enemy perception and topography drawn up (or rather, not being drawn up) by Trump. To draw up an image of evil enemies without making the drawing concrete, is a way to deny others the possibility of offering counter-arguments. The risk is that it boils up a sense of emergency on an in-transparent and potentially dishonest base.
Some may also think it is like this: Without a believable image of a worthy enemy, no true triumph. If an enemy is not there, it must be created, so I/we can be heroic and triumph: “Calumniate in order to become a freedom hero!”. Because you calumniate long enough, however, you eventually get real enemies and that is what lets you into the game. You are no longer counterfactual, when you claim others are against you. Somewhere deep down, the feeling of being unfree and surrounded by enemies may feel real, for reasons having to do with old personal history. You want to prove that inner truth right so that your life story has meaning and you retain the chance of restitution, and you provoke the enemy into real existence by the way you act, so you can subsequently overcome it – have vindication.
There is a danger in not seeing through projection, however. Take again the fictional sentence: “I don‘t understand why I am persistently rejected; discriminatory. If you are covertly against me, I will show you that I can actually beat you. That, then, gives better premises for freedom in my head; he who is not with me is against ‘our’ (cf. ‘my’) freedom”. A sentence quite like this may be what the powerful person, with his “weak and vulnerable” (actually stronger) side, could have told his insurmountable childhood obstacle, in stead of with his “strong and invulnerable” (actually weaker) side to good old “Uncle Sam.
When a tragically bewildered individual finally shoots at you, like others before shot at Kennedy, Raegan, Lincoln, King and others, your case is made. A possibly unrealistic and paranoid interpretation of Trump is that he willently provokes the democrats with statements and behaviors that lets them think he could be an autocrat, in the hope that the democrats will take the bait and fall into a trap of actually using undemocratic means against him. That, next, could be his justification for branding them threats to democracy from a reclaimed position at the white house. That would mean branding half of what used to make up “national unity” in the 20th century a threat to democracy: “In four years, you don’t have to vote again“. Slips of a too self-confident tongue?
Many now find it likely that Trump will win his re-election as president. If that happens, it would probably be beneficial if all (including democratic voters) tried initially to admit Trump his right to a final and honest chance to show himself from a better side towards his political opponents than thus far. They would be right to try that while retaining a hightened vigilance for Trump’s grasping of what individualism really means, and constantly reminding themselves that the important thing is not what happens the next four years, but what direction american, political culture takes the coming generation.
For Vance, as Trump’s running mate, his statement that a premis in the Biden-campaign had been that Trump was an authoritarian fascist, and that that made them directly responsible for the attempted assassination of Trump may be allowed to stand, even if there are reasons to disagree partly, because if his statement is allowed to stand, that implies a stricktly binding duty on the part of Trump to never act in an autoritarian manner, never to fulfill others’ fears about him that he resembles a semi-fascist justified.
If a re-elected Trump would act fascist’oidly, that would let Vance’s statement invalidated if understood as a lever placed under a board where Trump sits on the one end and his non-supporters nation wide on the other end. Accept for Vance’s statement would let the lever be placed close to Trump’s non-supporters and thus to Trump’s preliminary advantage.
If Trump acts fascist’oidly, however, Biden gets proven right. The lever would then be relocated to Trump‘s immediate vicinity. It is a matter of Vance’s autonomous sense of ethical responsibility to be honest about what he sees. Even though Trump hand-picked Vance, we do not want to think that the two is one of a kind or that loyalty-sensations towards a Persona is Vance’s primary motivating fuel.
Trump got some good wind in his sails after the tragic attempt of having him murdered. Few days later, the trial where he was indicted for illegaly keeping classified documents was rejected in Florida. The reason was that the appointment and funding og special councel Jack Smith had been illegal. The US constitution does not permit the justice department (cf. the attorney general) to appoint a private citizen and like-minded political ally to wield the prosecutorial power of the United States.
The attorney general (the head of the same justice department that Trump wants to politicize and weaponize) had ignored constitutional restrictions on the exercise of the prosecutorial power of the United States. In other words, it wasn’t certain enough in this case that the prosecutorial power of the crime-fighting justice department wasn’t politized and weaponized.
Again, like in the supreme court case about Colorado’s bid to bar Trump from re-running for president with reference to the insurrection clause in the constitution, Trump avoided reactions towards himself for completely other reason than proof having been weighed against the requirement of burden of proof for guilt for that of which he was accused and indicted.
In the document-case, the decisions even seems both correct and sensible. Why is that? It is because taking corruption of governmental power so that governmental power is no longer operating according to the constitution by its earliest root is imperative if such corrupt culture is not to take hold and be seen as normalized. Eventually, the constitution may then lose.
That sets down yet another lever between Trump and his non-supporters to his preliminary advantage. For that lever not to move rapidly towards Trumps side of the board, however, he must prove a new-found ability of consequential thinking (cf. the effective banning of double standards) no matter what party or what person. Having had the document-case dismissed for the reasons mentioned, Trump can never at the honor of his ability to use the same standard regardless of which side of the table he would sit at, politicize or weaponize the justice department by cutting any constitutional corners.
There can also not be any banana state-like bending of those corners while trying to create a public image with deceitful, fake news that there isn‘t. There must be a pattern of acting that evokes trust, not continued concern. No indictment of judges if he has formerly expressed a private – feeling – of suspicion that they are marxist. No indictment of critics if he has priorly expressed a private – feeling – that they are vermin. No reduction of press freedom if that isn’t clearly constitutionally granted. No intransparent, executive power (thus uni-partial) overseeing of elections if that isn’t granted by american tradition informed by the constitution or accepted on a bipartisan basis.
What seems to be needed, given all the toxicity and latent conflict, is maximalized transparency of all domains within which federal executive power is wielded (including the justice department). Trump’s history of seemingly sensing entitlement to power priveleges makes it imperative. There can be no threats to legitimate judicial office holders or their daughters, no more serial-lying (that would now equal state propaganda), no motive of revenge based on what others feel convinced are semi-deluded convictions. No novel realization of a maximalist interpretation of “the unitary executive theory” if that means loyalty-morality towards a person or party over the constitution coming in the way of a convincing transparancy as to whether the constitution is being governed by or not.
Kamela Harris has taken over for Biden as the democratic presidential candidate. Harris seems very tough and confident against all Trump is and stands for. She states things in the vein of her having handled corrupt criminals before, and that she will thus handle Trump too. She has even said she wants to see Trump behind bars. Isn’t that for the judiciary branch of government to decide. Harris shouldn’t confuse her own professional background with the executive branch office she now runs for. Fact is, she is still not extremely known to the borad american public. Maybe she will “handle Trump”. She will thus make no friends among the average republican voter, however.
Her rhetorical toughness may seem to some as subjectiveness-enhancing, not optimally intersubjective. They would rather like to see the democrats subtract their either acknowledged or maybe unacknowledged contributions to the ill dynamics that have brought the bipartisan US democracy towards hard fronts and conflict, from any criticism they launch against Trump.
If the shape and texture of american democracy is to be heroically fought for, it might seem to require that both mainstream parties and their respective leaders accept the full responsibility of averting national crisis by upholding laws and avoiding a majority-dictatorial leniency in the question of whether existing and commonly shared laws as the base of democracy should be upheld.
If they do not, the mainstream and far right will remain the only one part making that demand, in a more conflict-like fight with an equally radicalized left wing. How long can democracy survive in such a political environment? When Hitler won in Germany, the marxists were the second biggest party. German national unity functioning according to the standards of intersubjectivity close to the political center had been minimized as a minority combined. The center didn’t hold.
Harris might not be successful in unifying the country if she is not willing or able to embrace a “loose, free, cross-partisan we” as expression of national unity. If she does not, many Trump voters may see her as a symptom of the very problem they are protesting not to lose their country. Those who want to unite America, must represent the most center-leaning (moderate mainstream) flanks of their respective mainstream parties. If there is a national crisis, they must show that they priotitize reconciliation over partisan concerns – provided they see interest in the public’s trust in democracy.
That means being more intersubjective (cf. being a part of the center that must hold, reflecting national unity) and less conflict-rhetorical. Taking such a stance even if it does not come natural to you due to flank-oriented political sentiments, can be proof of true love of the country. Its may in fact be the necessary proof.
That, however, is something that is then true for both flanks. Harris, for one, must never with impunity be allowed to forget that she administers the legacy of the old-traditional mainstream democratic party of the USA of former national unity. She could be adviced to prove that she most of all loves the USA, that can only exist in its known form through national unity.
The true US American mentality from the war of independence, through the act of defending the founding fathers’ spirit in the constitution by the civil war, to WWII and finally the cold war against revolutionary world communism (marxism), is never to see any challenge as set too high – and then remarkably to have lived up to it in each decisive, just and righteous instance!
The first challenge onto which America – could – autonomously chose to re-implement that attitude at present, is by seeing to that the shape and texture of the known and loved political landscape – and – the sovereignty of the US constitution are – both – defended, even when Trump seem to sense that the challenge of saving both is one set too high for the US of A. In reality, it seems the most likely that there is only none or both.
Americans have made the world’s best constitution once before. However, 247 years has passed since then. At least the rest of the west (not wanting to speak for the rest of the world) would love it with excitement bordering on exhileration to see what came out if the same genious was applied with force after 247 more years of experience, to make a constitution sealing off all of the pitfalls pointed out in the above. How would that same genious do that? What completely new thing in the world it need to once again – create – to manage that?
Europeans too could have ideas as to how to seal off those pitfalls, but maybe our best ideas would be inferior, to frame-dependent and in effect backwards looking. The exhileration stems from not knowing in advance how that result would be, not being allowed to meddle with presumptive ideas tied down by limitation of the european outlook, just the same but further evolved, “uniquely different” american genious reborn as a new version of itself. Some just – trustingly believe – that genious has never really stopped existing! How could it – without having died?