6 SEEKING THE EUROPEAN SET POINT FOR AN INTERSUBJECTIVE SOLUTION WITH RUSSIA
The Baltic region and the question of ukrainean NATO membership.
Even if Trump should be able to land a deal with the Kremlin that ends the Ukraine war, we who live in countries in Europe should see that this will be a regulation of territories between two “bears”. That means that a potential for further conflicts is not yet past. Apart from assuring European unity and a symmetrical paste of armament as that of Russia, we must just as importantly look at changing our consciousness to reduce that overlasting risk of future conflict with Russia. Future conflicts may still lead to a WWIII, just like a great number of people feared that the Ukraine war could do.
Optimally, the two topics of “the Ukraine” and “the Baltic states” should be combined and seen in relationship to each other.
The Baltic region may need to be made focus of special attention in talks with Russia, because it has sizeable Russian-speaking minorities. Many of the Russian speaking people there moved in under Sojvet rule, so that the situation is a bit more comparable to how Germans moved into the Sudet-region under the HRE than how the situation was in the post-Sovjetic Ukraine.
A second, just as important reason for the dire need to talk to Russia about the Baltic states, is because of its strategic location making a NATO fortification here look to the Russians like a potentially life threatening attacking base on the doorstep of St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad, and also “dangerously close” to Moscow. This has certain parallels to the rationale of the Cuban missile crisis, which was that the geographical proximity to the United States caused the USA to deem it unsafe for them that the Sovjet Union should have a strongly weaponized presence there.
The way it honestly and clearly seems from a Western perspective, all three Baltic states have validity based on history for nation state claims. The lingual groups defining the country names have lived there since ancient times. Lithuanian is said to be one of the oldest surviving languages in Europe. Actually, the Belarusian population consists in part of formerly Baltic lingual group having been lingually slavified by past Russian influence, in part of Russian descending people. Today’s Baltic states constitute the small rest of a once bigger Baltic lingual region still not having become slavified. The Baltic states were the last ones to become part of the Sovjet Union, as a result of a deal between the Sovjet Union and – Adolf Hitler. They were the very first Sovjet republics to declare their independence, even before Russia itself.
Presently Russian speaking people in the Baltic states, however, must be treated as full-worthy citizens there, with all rights to their language due to a time bar for historic events (the Sudet-germans would have enjoyed the same rights due to time bars had it not been for Hitler – Kosovo Albanians should enjoy the same rights if Serbia should ever be reunited), and one must minimize and eliminate “majority-dictatorial” decision making within the Baltic democracies that disadvantage the Russian speaking population.
Maybe Russian observers together with non-EU, non-NATO observers from the always neutral Switzerland (ideally representing all four swiss languages) can be sent there to cooperate by overseeing in tandem that the equal civil and democratic rights of Russian speaking Balts are fylly respected. The alternative is that Russians may unilaterally deem it just for Russia to “ensure” the rights of Russian speaking Balts. Russia should be encouraged to reflect over the issue of whether to reinterpret the tearing down of Sovjet monuments in the Baltic states, not as anti-Russian, but as anti-Marxist.
The Baltic states should not be expelled from NATO, but NATO in the Baltic states should not be intended as a permanent arrangement any more than it is (not) in Portugal. NATO (as long as it remains relevant) should never classify its members as A- and B-members (that is no viable concept for any defence alliance – there would barely even be a point to being a B-member), but NATO-countries where there is deemed to be no threat, do not have international NATO-fortifications (hence the above mentioning of Portugal).
If NATO is rendered redundant or even just if the EU creates a credible security order, the EU may take over the present security responsibilities of NATO in the Baltic states. The Baltic states are EU-members. Regardless of whether NATO- or EU-based forces, however, it should be a “far term” goal to better Russo-European relations to the point where national defences for the Baltic states is deemed sufficient.
As of present, however, that trust-building has a long way to go. Thus, it must be stated as a “far term” goal, but the goal should be stated, nonetheless. It might be relevant that it is stated even though Russia is likely to distrust it exactly due to its open ended lack of concrete time tables. If Russia is unwilling to publically acknowledge that trust is mutually lacking, however, then we have nothing to “work with” to improve that same level of trust.
NATO (or the future EU) should take as their goal a “far term” demilitarization of foreign forces in the Baltic states. In exchange for trustworthy / believable signs of lasting peace / friendship and perpetual stability of EU-Russian borders, the Baltic states should then only armed with national military forces bar the event of a concrete and clearly observable threat situation. The potential of increased trust should be directive for our choices, and that is the reason why it is relevant to state the goal of far term nationalization of Baltic defences.
Over to the Ukraine: The Russian ex-president Medvedev allegedly said in August 2023 that the Ukraine must give up Kiew, the capital of the medieval Rus Empire, for a peace agreement which means that Ukraine can then become part of NATO. He did not say that Ukraine had to give up its capital Kiew for a peace agreement in which Ukraine does not become a member of NATO, but before the capital of the medieval Rus Empire ends up in NATO, Russia would not choose peace.
Who lived in the medieval Rus Empire? The empire had an inherent north-south polarity, with Novgorod (the original Novgorod – called “Holmgård” by the Vikings) and Kiew as the northern and southern centers, respectively. Both cities were capitals, first Novgorod, then Kiew. If the Ukraineans are descendants of the people who had Kiew as their capital, shouldn’t the opinions of the population of this “capital region” be given weight? If they sense wholeheartedly to have a separate national identity, Ukrainean, is that somehow “not valid”?
What many of today’s Russians might lament is possibly the loss of the medieval Ukrainian-Russian unity. Ultimately, the Mongols were to blame, since they caused The Rus Empire to crumble. Moscow’s rule was originally the Mongol’s subsequent, Russian satelite state that had eventually won its independence from the Mongols. Before this new, Moscow-based empire expanded to include the Ukraine by the means of an expansivism that also gave the Russian Zars dominion over central Asia, the Ukraine was already linguistically separated (the Ukrainian language is as different from Russian as it is from Polish), but – maybe – this lingual difference is partly an expression of the south-north polarity of the Rus empire?
The three Scandinavian countries have closely related, north-germanic languages. Neither Sweden, Denmark or Norway see that as a reason that Sweden as the most populous country should have a natural right to superiority within Scandinavia. If Sweden suddenly started to think this, it would lead to a detoriation of close, good relations. Off course, if Denmark and Norway self-inflictedly were perceived as anti-Swedish and enacting of for instance a hostile British interest, a development like the mentioned one could become less unrealistic. Is the Russian will to pan-slavic superiority exclusively a posteriori like this? Are they – in real – similar enough for fairly unstrained intersubjectivity with other slavic speaking nations?
Europeans tend to criticize Trump’s acceptance that the Ukraine remains a non-NATO member. Are we right to be critical? We may be critical of the frame conditions under which Trump accepted it (territorial regulation between two “bears”, with others being objects to their incidental decisions made out of seeming self-interest). Can we come to the same conclusion as Trump, however, but for different reason?
A “Western” attitude that many in Europe will see as the opposite of a hardliner attitude (but still one that is based on western European subjectivity) is that the Ukraine may either have borders as of 1991 and cannot become a member of NATO, or the Ukraine may accept loss of territory, but may then become a NATO member if they want to, since they are a truly sovereign nation.
Maybe – a solution like the mentioned one is “fair”, but the question is whether it is the most “wise”. The difficulty is that the latter solution may not be the most friendship-facilitating solution in a 100-year or 1000-year perspective. Should we in western Europe, however, need to be even more nuanced even when we believe ourselves to be nuancing allready?
With the Ukraine as a NATO-member, Russia with its inherent distrust of the West may continue to fear a future Ukrainean “revenge” with the full force of NATO. We in Europe may think that sounds “incredible”, but there has been a Napoleon, and there has been a Hitler. It does provide grounds for a sense of a somewhat more subtle form of Russian subordination relative to the USA as the Western “bear”, for maintained future mistrust, and for a senseless loss of historical ties within the pan-Slavic cultural sphere.
Without outright rejecting the subjectively western European “sense of justice” then, before we go “all in” for it, we in Europe can at least investigate more seriously whether a solution can be found which better optimizes the possibility of friendship in the long term and which can at the same time be safe for everyone.
If the NATO becomes obsolete, like some now even think could actually happen, having fought hard to bring the Ukraine into it may “backlash”. It should be investigated seriously whether there can exist premises that it be safe for everyone that Ukraine (and other former Soviet republics not allready granted NATO-memberships) are not offered NATO membership unless Russia can simultaneously both wish the same and be offered it.
This can, not improbably, be thought of as the more realistic counter-condition for Russia to want to consider a proposal where Russian speaking citizens of the Baltic states are NATO members. Without an understanding that Ukraine remains outside of NATO, Russia may still feel “pressured” by NATO and “always find” decisive objections regarding the proposal for the Baltic states.
Without the Ukraine being guaranteed as a non-NATO country, it may at worst prove unlikely that a “Baltic arrangement” will be tension-free enough to function. However, we are dependent on creating probable / viable solutions if we care the most about the distant future of humanity.
NATO (or an equivelant EU defence alliance if NATO should become obsolete) should, in an ideal world, be nothing other or more than a mutual willingness for solidary defense support reflecting credible friendships between neighbours; a kind of friendship we must not put extra obstacles in the road for between us and Russia. Russia is a part of Europe geographically, and any divisive solution is a pathological one, wherever the pathology may have its reason.
Sweden, thinking their own national sacurity-situation worsened based on what they witnessed happening in the Ukraine, sought NATO-membership. The NATO-member Turkey first vetoed their admission, to the disbelief and dismay of all Swedens neighborly friends. Is this Turkey our crucial ally should we direly need defensive assistance? Britain came out, unilaterally, vowing to defend Sweden should they be attacked by Russia.
That resembled actual friendship. Britain viewed Sweden as a valuable friend they would defend for similar reasons that the United States defended Europe in World War II. Britain’s example can become a standard of admiration, but also shows the artificiality of pact-alliances such as NATO. They may be more expressive of the state of the world during the cold war, with two world ideologies fighting for dominance and not to be dominated. Friendship is more important, more lasting and reliable.
On Juli 07.2023. it was broadcast that NATOs general secretary at the time, Jens Stoltenberg, had said that Ukraine could get a guarantee from major countries within NATO, but individually, pending negotiations on membership in NATO. He also said that this could allow Ukraine to be covered by something “close to” NATO’s Article 5.
In Russia, that statement probably seemed to be some sort of “sneaky”, boundary-less and/or self-emulsificating manner in which to expand of NATO or at least NATO’s domain of direct influence outside of what NATO itself describes as due process. However, it also communicated something either paradoxical or contradictory. What he did not say, but which one may easily think, is that “friendship” will could go a long way even without NATO.
If there is no formal order of a defence alliance experienced by the Russians as expansive, threatening, moralizing and inconsequential, then pledging alliegence based on friendship is no longer boundary-overflowing and self-emulsificating. The only reason it can be viewed that way, is if it is not “cleanly separated” from the formerly mentioned type of order of a defence alliance so that it can be slandered as a dishonest means to excluding, block-based dominance. The USA saved western Europe in WWII, before NATO existed.
What is problematic about NATO when it comes to the war in the Ukraine is that “we”; NATO’s member countries, taken individually, want to act in solidarity with a country that defends itself, out of friendship, whereas NATO as an organization has been interpreted as a boundary-challenging power-instrument by Russia. We therefore represent with our actions two different behavioral principles interchangeably, not “cleanly separated” from each other.
Blind to the truth of the one aspect (cf. how NATO can be viewed as a block-based threat, not only as a framwork for defencive co-solidarity), we are thus also blind regarding the truth about the other aspect (cf. that our friendship-based solidarity beyond NATO turns into something not unproblematic given NATO as the inadvertable frame condition). In an extrapolated interpretation of reality, friendship based defence solidarity would not even have been needed in the Ukraine had it not been for the national security motives of Russia to go to war due to NATO. The “West” has not understood the value of “mental hygiene” as pertains to separating these two different principles from each other, so that a motive for action cannot be misunderstood as something other than what it really is.
This requires, firstly, improved self-awareness and a willingness to self-criticism. This means that we actively must – sever – any reason that let the Russians sensibly interpret our solidarity aid measures as an expression of an anti-Russian drive towards power and dominance. From Russia, it has appeared as if our arms support to Ukraine is part of a block-based power struggle, since we have not subtracted our own contributions to the dynamics that have led to armed conflict. Russia thinks that NATO’s support of the Ukraine could be a prelude to serious threats to them.
Given the history of power-based, block-based relations during the Cold War, and for much more inexplicable reasons still after its end, NATO could take the consequences of its own contributions to the ill dynamics, by seriously investigating an option in which the Ukraine does not become a NATO-member. It is partially because of NATO that not even NATO member countries singularly can now support Ukraine motivated by friendship without this being misinterpreted as a Western block hardliner mentality.
It was mentioned above that in a more ideal world, guarantees of friendship devoid of ideology should have been NATO’s sole meaning. When NATO as a pact has become “geopolitically charged” and as such a problem, we should signal to Russia that we will look just as much towards friendship as towards pacts in the future. Russia should not perceive that guarantees of friendship apply to everyone except themselves.
Instead, we must be able to say to Russia that in the future, friendship with Russia and Ukraine, regardless of pact alliances, may become a reason for military co-defence of the part that weakens our friendship by breaking the other’s; by attacking the other one among our friends. That, theoretically, could still trigger a world war, but each country would then individually have increased autonomy in the choices that lead to their own destiny. A third world nuclear death trap, alike for all (because of an stupidly algorithm-like article 5 actuation), will be reduced.
Even if the EU becomes more federalized and has an own (latent) central command, the chance of a world war being ignited for reasons of “systemic stupidity” will be reduced through the increased systemic intelligence of a more federalized system.
Saying either “both Russia and the Ukraine” or “neither Russia and the Ukraine” is what NATO should have said clearly from 1990 onward. It was difficult for European nations to say that and put power behind it, especially during the Bush jr. era. Bush jr. tried to manipulate European countries by calling the democraphically and economically weighty France and Germany “the old Europe” and thereby trying to ingratiate himself with southern and eastern Europe, calling them “the new Europe”.
Bush jr., however, here seems to have tried to understand Europe based on the template of the USA itself, where the former “central region” of the northeast, the early industrialized northeast that won the 19th century civil war in the defence of the US constitution, has gotten weakened economically and demographically relative to the US south and US west. Bush jr.’s innovative terms “old Europe” and “new Europe” have not stood the test of time. For instance, “old Europe” came out on top through the financial crisis from 2008 onward and while France and Germany has had stable or weakly growing populations thus far, both the south and the east of Europe has seen population loss.
The point, however, is that we should not unwittingly have acted in a similar manner towards Russia after the end of the cold war. We should not have communicated to Russia (well enough not in so many words) that they are “old slavic power” and in the cold for not agreeing with us, whereas other former Sovjet states that were more effortless for us to relate intersubjectively with were “new slavic power” and in the warmth. “We” should have wished to see the CIS retained. That is, in a more ideal recent past we should have pro-actively have avoided the opposite, taking more of a 100-years perspective on the pan-European situation as a whole.
Saying this, with delay, can signal increased equality and making amends for the past. Not doing it now, can be interpreted as the opposite. Ukraine, if it remains outside of NATO, can be encouraged to see that the entire proposal for an arrangement for the Baltic region supports a proposal where Russia and NATO have a lot to lose by breaking Ukraine’s neutrality. If it goes badly in the Ukraine, the level of trust could drop so much that the risk of the solution concerning the Baltic region going badly increases drastically.
A domino-like chain reaction could take place if a new war erupts in the Ukraine, with the Baltic arrangement being the next piece. With the present proposal, the Ukraine would be bound into regional security arrangements, not formally, but more informally. Any defensive military alliance that in the long run does not reflect real friendship will become obsolete.
Wrapping it up
Canada‘s former prime minister Trudeau commented on Trump’s historically unique 25% customs tariff against them while he was still in office on march 4th 2025: “Trump wants the Canadian economy to collapse to make annexation easier”. One should not be paranoidly suspicious, but Trump has said that he wants Canada to become part of the USA, not that he wants negotiations with Canada about an equanimous union / equanimous fusion of the two nations. If a Mexican individual about to become President there drew a map of all north-America with boundaries erased and the name “Mexico” all over it, Americans would probably be glad they are the clearly more powerful nation. Trump has called Canada a state of The United States and the Canadian prime minister “Governor”. Would anyone be surprised if Putin talked like that about the Ukraine? How would it be if China’s head of state talked that way about the USA? Trump has also said he does not rule out military power to take Greenland. If one doesn’t get paranoid towards anyone but those who makes it the easiest to get paranoid towards them, that is not “all too” paranoid. It is then also being healthily vigilant. One should hope the Canadians would not need to the take economic customs toll as the toll of a well enough cold, defensive war for enduring independence. Trump might be better than such an interpretation, but if he is, he expects blind faith from the Canadians in his relatively greater degree of benevolence without giving them overt reasons for it. He is intransparent; an incalculable “power figure” whose mysterious whims others are expected to live at the mercy of, not the same as the democratic ideal of leadership. Some have aired the idea that Canada becomes an EU member, which might not be a good idea. It may give rise to dynamics that resemble Russia’s arguments for controlling the Ukraine for reasons of future national security. Canada and the USA are forever inadvertable friends – at popular core.
Trump has had a good relationship with Putin, calling Zelenskij but not Putin a dictator, accepting the narrative that the Ukraine provoked the war, all the while criticizing European countries for undemocratic development domestically, saying the EU was formed to “screw over” the USA and that Russia should do whatever it wants to European countries not meeting military spending goals. He wants Greenland from Denmark, hence from the EU (an obvious instance of international order trumping international law). Can we in European countries still let our intelligence services share information with Trump’s government; with our good old friend the USA? If we don’t do it, his hostility towards us may likely be “worked up” even further and as of now, that might have even heavier consequences that are still avoidable, so we keep sharing information while we keep monitoring the overall situation. Trump might be better than our worst interpretations of him, but if he is, he expects blind faith from us in his relatively greater degree of benevolence without giving us overt reasons for it. He is intransparent; an incalculable “power figure” whose mysterious whims others are expected to live at the mercy of, not one to one the same as the democratic ideal of leadership. A Persona of self-conscious power radiation with an own glow of omnipotence. Trump seems to personally “feed off of” it; on being able to shine in such a public image, but maybe that is just an “evil European misperception”.
On March 13th 2025 it gets broadcast that Trump’s internationalist “white house intern”, Mr. Musk (him trying to win influence for his political ideology not only domestically but abroad does warrant the term “internationalist”), has said to Poland’s foreign minister: “Be quite, little man! “. Is this the new debate form within the American democracy? Those of us not among the very youngest remember the long historical epoch when America was about freedom of speech and “all men are born equal” (presumptively implying all women as well). Now, it seems, Trump’s own, unique “debate form” has infected weak, easily impressionable others around him. There are many strange photos where Mr. Musk stands behind a stern, darkly severe Trump like a euphoric boy (intoxicated by co-power?). What lets Mr. Musk speak that way is a hybrid of financial force and political shadow-power. Is his dream to have enough of both that “little men speaking when they shouldn’t” ceases to be a problem? Mr. Musk is an example of “money buying power” (his political shadow-power seems to be a direct result of his strong support of Trump in the 2024 election). Trump standing on the lawn in front of The White House showing a price list of Teslas is the reciprocical “power supporting money”. On March 17th 2025 it gets broadcast that Musk wants to stop a billion contract that the Federal Aviation Administration had ordered from the company Verizon. In stead, Musk’s company Starlink is now to assist the aviation authorities. Is this a result of free competition in line with Smith’ian capitalism, or is it an instance of corrupt misuse of power? Is it an instance of a step in the direction of state regulated rather than free economy? For foreign countries to enter into free globalized trade with such an economy gives a pressure to be just as corrupt yourself, or suffer the disadvantages of not attaining the benefits of corruption as the sole market competitor. Mr. Musk is also accused of cutting staff and funding to public organs that have investigated companies he owns, something he is given authority to do by Trump as a non-elected, not congress-approved executive government shadow-power official. Shadow power…how does that in any way rhyme with the transparency of democracy? Trump – is solely responsible for allowing this. It is on the cape of his quality of democratic judgement. Musk would be powerless without the embrace of Trump. When Mr. Musk then tried to influence Germany’s 2025 democratic election as a foreign government affiliate, that is just as under-educated about what democracy is and just as boundarylessly self-emulsification, as his unhistorical mixup of financial force and political power still being deemed as corruption at least in traditionally protestant European countries.
Through the above examples, it becomes visible that NATO is not based on equanimity, just like Russia due to their differing experiences has seen through since long before Trump. Trump makes it visible to us in Europe. His well enough unarticulated, but alpha-like “you should be free and autonomous by being it the way I norm for you” could be interpreted charitably as relatively benignly “paternalistic” by an ego-centric person not in full control of his thoughts and words. What is supposed to grant the self-claimed status as such, is economical and military muscle mass and body size. That does not reflect democratic ideals, but an alpha-like expectiation of others’ subsumption. Calling Trump’s behavior paternalistic, however, is even a charitable interpretation. Regardless, any part in Europe who finds that his – words and actions – triggers nausea, will need to fight peacefully for a future in which our nations are sovereign along all dimensions. We cannot turn unrealistic, however, and the first step of such a peaceful fight is to start with the present.
If Trump is the one who lands a peace deal in the Ukraine first, we who live in countries in Europe should not allow ourselves to just lean on it. We cannot simply conclude that it “takes a bear to handle a bear”; “bears don’t listen to people, poor freedom and democracy”. Saying such things is pathetic. Yes, we can talk to anyone. In Russia, we have no choice, for more than just one good reason, it must go through Putin.
Trump’s suggested solution creates vulnerability for all parts. The USA then gets economic interests in the Ukraine, something that is simply – claimed – by Trump to equal security guarantees for the Ukraine (what is the Ukraine’s proof that it actually is? It could also be a sneaky way to optimize interests without taking any risks). The Ukraine, however, is a Slavic speaking nation bordering Russia, and this is no ideal recepy for perpetual peace. The highly problematic situation of the Baltic region is not solved and if Russia sees their options in the Ukraine as narrowed down for the time being, that could cause them to direct their focus mainly to the Baltic situation in stead. Even unrest in Bosnia and Kosovo could re-erupt.
Additionally, the USA could be assessed to have a slightly higher risk of future inner conflict than earlier. This is not said to scare or feed into self-fulfilling prophecies, but is merely mentioned honestly according to how statistical margins can be assessed by some. Should a second civil war break out in the USA, and we have not even begun a process towards improved mutual understanding between us and Russia, that could be unfortunate, to phrase it carefully.
This all goes to show that the Ukraine situation needs a European solution. The first attempt at a peace deal in the Ukraine was made by Trump. Then Starmer and Macron tried. To say, now central Europe with Germany as the more weighty partner must try, may sound like the most futile third attempt thinkable. Germany with its passenger-role. Germany without any deterrent nuclear power. Germany with “its history”. However, one may conditionally “beg to differ”.
“I think you capable of all evil. Therefore, I want the good from you.” (Nietzsche, 1883, Thus spoke Zarathustra, Part 2, about the venerable)
Germany is located geographically the middle of east and west. They are incorporated in “the West” because of the combination of the loss in WWII and the outcome of the cold war. The passenger role is no longer in line with enlightened German self-interest. The train has no low odds of falling off a cliff, whether that cliff is arrived at in two years or in twenty years.
Germany’s guilt induced servility and passenger-role within the West is a gaping hole where the natural center of Europe lies; a European tragedy and a tragedy for Europe. With the possible exception of Emperor Ferdinand II who set off the religious “thirty years war” 1618-48 where over 1/3 of all germans were killed by due to catholic aggression using Spanish conquistadors, no one has hurt what for centuries of the more distant past used to be “central Europe’s good order” more than all of history’s premium psychopathic idiot – Adolf Hitler. Germany lost 1/3 of its land area and got divided for almost half a century. The overlasting losses to Germany’s position caused by him substantially surpasses those inflicted upon France by Napoleon. Without Hitler and the way he forced an exodus of Jewish-german science, Germany would likely have been the nation to invent the nuclear bomb. Without Hitler and the nazis, they could have done so without there being a heightened chance of Germany subsequently using it.
If Europe’s “middle region” could nonetheless still be re-established as “autonomously unaffected” (more ideally and more viably so if it takes place in tandem with Scandinavia, the Low countries and the Alp region) it is even now still “big enough” to serve as a “balancing factor” in Europe. Some have asked if the EU can survive the turns in an autocratic direction in Hungary and to a lesser extent; Poland. Wouldn’t western Europe, including Germany, profit more from letting the EU remain a western European club and as such the exclusive part of the West? For Germany, the answer is no. That would make them a potential buffer zone and front line. We must own the capacity to contain degrees of autocracy in our midst, while showing the advantages of the opposite through our own example. If we didn’t think like this, we would need to try and expel Trump’s USA from the West.
Starmer and Macron represents the “true European West” and nuclear powers. In their attempt at a peace process, they did not subtract the West’s contributions to the ill dynamics that has led to increased tension and finally war. For these reasons, they seem by the Kremlin to fight for a Western sphere of influence; “the West” as a pan-European concept, if you will. Not exactly like the USA, but not comfortingly unlike it either, such as seen from Russia.
Starmer and Macron wanted military safety guarantees for the Ukraine. Not economic rights like Trump, but a peace keeping military presence from their own countries. Such a safety guarantee would not exclude a role for the USA in the event of a warm conflict. To the contrary, the USA could easily get drawn into it if the forces would need to defend the Ukraine. At the same time as this concept was aired, Trump cut all American military and intelligence support to the Ukraine, still trying to pressure them to accept his peace deal. This let the Russians eye renewed hope also on the battle field. In sum, Russia didn’t see any sufficiently great suspense between advantages and disadvantages to enter into any serious peace process with Starmer and Macron.
A third attempt must make actual admissions and acknowledge the West either more or less unacknowledged contributions to the ill dynamics. Who better to do that in the eyes of the Russians, than someone who wouldn’t have had to end up as part of “the West” as they rise up and away from a historically inflicted “passenger role”? At the same time, Germany and other central European nations are so close to Russia geographically that they have a more legitimate interest in “peace in the neighborhood” and are less suspectible to ideological motivations. Russia could come to eye that merit.
Yes, the two oldest, modern democracies (Britain and the USA) are truly Western (both may argue, variously, to be the very first modern democracy). In a 100 years maybe we and possibly even they themselves will view their present form as “good prototypes” both constitutionally and as pertains to what “attitude” with which to carry “the robe of democracy”. However, even though the first modern democracies were truly Western, any third attempt at peace in the Ukraine will not succeed if Russia insist on viewing democracy and “the West” as synonyms (cf. that democracy is then an inautonomous expression of European countries’ claimed sovereignty). We who live in central European countries don’t fight for our democracies now because we have been counted as “Western”.
“All political powers now try to exploit the anxiety for socialism [cf. marxism] to strengthen themselves. In longer term, only democracy has advantage from this, because all parties have a need to ingratiate themselves with the people and give them reliefs and freedoms of all kinds, whereby the people eventually becomes omnipotent. Socialism [cf. Marxism], as a teaching about change in how propoerty is attained, lies the farthest from the people. When the people itself gets the screw of taxation in their own hands through the big majorities in their parliaments, then slowly it will actually build a middle class with progressive taxes for capitalists, traders and the stock exchange dominion, so that they can forget socialism [cf. marxism] like a defeated illness“. (Nietzsche, 1880, in Human, All Too Human, Part 3, #292)
If the Russians insist on seeing the West and democracy as synonyms, as something that merely cursors European democracies’ lack of autonomy, then a third attempt to find peace in the Ukraine at peace will also fail. A consequence could be that “the West” as a pan-European concept gets re-established/re-affirmed with all forces of haste, destroying among other things also any bettered relations among the nations within the pan-Slavic sphere.
Central Europe, however, must in and through the third attempt demonstrate for the Russians that their democracies reflect their true autonomy and true sovereignty through their choices and their courses of action. If Russia can believe it, the same could even be true even for any smaller nations even further east – if simultaneously these can have historical merit for nation state claims.
If Russia accepts this, then these smaller, even more eastern nations will not be driven to wish our (Western or central European) alliegance to the exclusion of setting normalization of their relationships with Russia as a simultaneous goal for an ideal future. Speaking for central Europe, that is not our long term (100-1000 years) wish. The prospect of starting realistic, long term (10-100 years) processes to better the relations within the pan-Slavic sphere can then begin.
The suggestion thus far is that the Baltic states remain NATO-fortified for the time being, with a long term goal of an end to that conditionally to increased trust, hence without a deadline, but meanwhile also with a permanent swiss-russian contingency in the Baltic states for monitoring of the Russian speaking Baltic citizens’ “democratic conditions”.
Further, the second part of the suggestion is that the Ukraine turns into an independent nation state that, as a sovereign nation state has the self-evident right to seek EU-membership, yet which is not to be offered NATO-membership or any pre-emptive international military reinforcement in the form of foreign military personal or equipment owned by another nation. Along with Russia, they may be given bilateral wows from European countries to be co-defended/supported in the future if they were to be attacked by the other one of the two. The specifics of the outline for a latent, central EU command presented priorly allows for this even if the Ukraine becomes an EU-member.
If such wows are given bilaterally, however, isn’t it then a flaw to let an imagined, future, central EU command effectuate the wows? Not necessarily if, as priorly outlined, each EU-member has an individual reservation right towards the actuation of the imagined, central EU command. There is nothing here equivalent to NATO’s article 5, viewable as a dangerous and stupid algorithm. There is meant to be internal diciplination for acting like a “loose canon”. Democratic processes are meant to be anchored democratically bottom up, even at the most federalized level. The central EU command cannot condone of acts of invation that are forbidden by an overworked EU-constitution that the NATO lacks.
If Russia interprets this whole suggestion (in its sum) as a starting position for purely transactional negotiations, then customary “haggling” will reduce the final result to something no longer acceptable to central Europe. The suggestion is thought of as a beginning, yes, but not of purely transactional negotiations. Rather, it must be seen as the beginning of an intersubjective process between Russia and Europe. Even so, there may be a need to for Europe to take hight for the possible need of adjustments, based on the merit of the reasons given for it by Russia.
If there is no intersubjectivity, however, there will not be “haggling” with the same proposition as starting point in stead. Intersubjectivity here means that if we reject a reason given by the Russians for not agreeing with us, we must likewise give an equally good reason for rejecting their reason, thereby giving Russia a chance to give further responses, keeping dialogue going – having a strong will not to give it up, accepting that intersubjectivity must not imply ease of effort.
Even so, isn’t this whole suggestion for Europe to be giving too much and demanding too little, almost as if attemptedly appeasing Russia – like out of fear? The Ukraine will probably say “there is nothing here that corresponds to security guarantees”. Maybe it is not fear based, but the opposite; still naïve in its lack of fear; a continuation of Europe’s naivity since 1991, now even despite of the fact of the Ukraine war. What is there at all to saying “the part that threatens the one (Baltic or Ukrainean) solution thereby also threatens the other (Ukrainean or Baltic) solution”? That would at the very least require a stronger deterrent power, the Ukraine would say.
Being or maybe only feeling hard-hearted, however, the Europeans may say to the Ukraine: A sort of a not pre-given security guarantee was encashed by you in and through this war’s enormous material support. Our further interest is not obligations that can entail a “new round” of increased risk to ourselves, but on the contrary, a solution that probability-calculates what gives the most minified chance for a new, later conflict. Here, the interests of “the rest of Europe” may differ from those of the Ukraine in nuances that are worthwhile being completely open and honest about. It is those nuances that makes our stance not mainly naïve, but attemptedly wise (only the outcome may prove if it actually is).
The Ukraine wishes for a guarantee that the war cannot repeat itself. In nature, there are no guarantees. The whole of Europe now experiences more of guaranteelessness. We want, keeping a cool head, to minimize the basis for another war – by not giving guarantees. We would rather support the Ukraine again voluntarily without having given guarantees of it in advance, than having given guarantees if we do not deem that to be the wisest course; if we deem the probability of a new, future war is thereby heightened.
A form of deterrence will exist and is threefold: (A) European countries’ wow to support the defence of whichever of Russia and the Ukraine who, both as our friends, will be attacked by the other in the future, even so if the Ukraine has become an EU-member and Russia has not. (B) If Russia attacks the Ukraine in the future, “the West” as a pan-European concept will likely be re-established in haste out of the self-interest of European countries given such a situation, just like all of Europe could get pan-Slavic minded if Russia was already a close friend and the USA then attacked France. (C) if both A and B are made actual, then the suggested “Baltic solution” would likely destabilize and that – could – ultimately cause WWIII, which would not unlikely involve the use of nuclear weapons. The Ukraine must, unfortunately, live like Sweden and Finland voluntarily did during the cold war. The most that we can say to the Ukraine is “our sincerest apologies for it”!
If NATO still stands in the Baltic states, however, Russia may still sense it as though “the West” as a pan-European concept has not ceased to exist. We must, preliminary, hope to be able to bring the Russians to see that the bigger country of the Ukraine is the most important indicative of a real change and that to the Baltic states, we have given our words, which we put our honor into not breaking. That also highlights why making the Ukraine a NATO-member might be necessary to abstain from. Without it, we would have nothing to “show for” in our claim that we intend real change. We could, however, make a deal that no nuclear powers are to stand in the Baltic region, for instance if Russia expresses that it would rather have Germany standing there than either Britain or France.
Furthermore, some Russians could say: This purported notion that central Europe is to be autonomous and unaffected by the USA or the Anglo-Saxon cultural sphere, wouldn’t that actually require that they exit NATO themselves? For central European countries pro-actively to exit NATO at this point in history, before a more credible EU security order has taken its place, however, would be a radical and “not really sane” playing with their own national security. Which European neighbors are going to want to help us if we don’t want to help anyone else?
In talks with Russia, however, it can be discussed if all of NATO’s responsibilities east of central Europe (the Baltic assignment inclusively) is to be replaced by an EU security order in the future, without unnecessary delay if and when EU-based safety order takes form. This could be a great advantage in any case, if NATO should somehow come to disintegrate disorderly, something that is not as impossible to imagine as it was five years ago, for instance if Trump steals Greenland from a NATO ally, thwarting its inhabitants peaceful, gradual fight for independence.
The eastern NATO-countries of today (for instance Poland) will probably have instincts warning against this, but we should hope to be able to bring them to see that the re-prioritizations and instability of course on the part of the USA makes a well established EU security order better than NATO. A mutually neighborly investment in peace in the neighborhood will have a much higher threshold of disintegrating disorderly. This is especially true when NATO is a “red cloth” to the Russians because of the transcontinental “bears game”. The EU is truly pan-European, and as an extra carrot for Russia, the USA’s special friend Britain isn’t even part of it any longer. The UK exited the EU according to its own wish in 2020. Off course, they would be welcomed back with open arms. They are an irremovable part of Europe and a closest, historic friend to Scandinavia.
Back to the question of whether this whole suggestion is for Europe to be giving too much and demanding too little: It is thinkable that Russia will only be willing to give their sincere word to someone both willing and daring to actually treat them like a trustworthy partner. It may resonate with many people on an individual level, who think: “The honor of my word counts then, when it is given without threats or pressures to give it which signals underlying fear, hostility or unwarranted power-consciousness” on the part of the opponent. Today’s fear of the other may too easily transform into tomorrows hostility of that same other. This might be how Russia senses.
For central Europeans to believe in the common humanity of the Russians enough to trust it despite of seeming risks to do so, might just be the sole condition under which the Russians may will be willing to prove trustworthiness, because it is the only approach that signals a European attitude of true equanimity. If this argument is correct, that is the manner in which the suggested approach equals an attempt at wisdom. The line here between wisdom and naivity is a thin one. Maybe we are a “bunch” of “western European Gorbachevs” (Gorbachev loosened up Sovjetic central control – in manner that by any uncharitable interpretation immediately would get branded as naïve, by charitable intepretations as humanistic). However, this “bunch” would doubtlessly go along well with Russian Gorbachevs.
If, however, a (latent) central EU command is created in the future, wouldn’t that give the Russians reason to rethink whether they tolerate the Ukraine being part of EU, for reasons similar to their present opposition to Ukrainean NATO-membership? Well, a European brokered peace deal for the Ukraine war will with necessity historically predate any possible EU-membership negotiations for the Ukraine. Hence, a Ukrainean EU-membership will for reasons of international jurisdiction not be able to “touch” a premise for the peace deal that says the Ukraine shall have no stationing of foreign military personell or foreign owned weapons pre-emptively. If a future Ukraine conceived of as a nation state is attacked by a foreign country (for instance Turkey or Russia), however, the EU may support / co-defend the Ukraine non-preemptively. If the EU creates a military central command, the present proposal is that for any extra-European purposes, it should be possible to actuate only in the event of invation of the EU.
If Europe wows to co-defend both the Ukraine and Russia if either one is attacked by the other, shouldn’t Russia then also expect that they can be offered an EU-membership, like the Ukraine? To use the vocabulary of Trump: “It might not be practical” for Russia to be a member of the EU. They have a justified self-consciousness as a global superpower that could cause strain/abration of the EU’s structural frameworks the way it is concipated, a bit like if the USA should become an EU-member. However, we should probably “never say never”. Maybe, Russia and the EU can come to agreement about this – intersubjectively? Both sides must then acknowledge that the question of a Russian EU-membership carries with it a much greater weight and is hampered by much more complexity than that for any country that is not a nuclear superpower of 150 million people describing itself as a multinational empire and with less of a democratic history then what we have. The EU is, and has the right to define itself as, a union of relatively similar democracies. Russia may at any rate, given improved relations compared with the present, be offered a partnership with the EU, like Britain, Switzerland or the USA.
The EU must never become a concept that top down competes with the pan-slavic sphere as a frame for cultural and friendship based interaction. Russia needs to be able to interpret the EU as a “peaceful order” that capably regulates development safely outside of and around any episodes of “pathological dissosiations” like those of Napoleon and Hitler, and without underlying “bear power” from a different continent, be it China or the USA. Maybe (but only maybe) a bit too hopefully, we could suggest to Russia that, through the EU, and in a very best future, they have the solidarity not only of the Slavic speaking Europe, but of all of it.
As to the latter point, the more Russia, in and through its self-defence, defends values that we would also have wanted to defend, the more their role vis a vis Europe can resemble that of the USA relative to western Europe after 1945, namely as friendship based.
“We wouldn‘t let ourselves burn form our opinions – we aren‘t that sure of them. But maybe, that we are to be allowed to have our opinions and that we are to be allowed to change them.” (Nietzsche, 1880, in Human, All Too Human, Part 3, #333)
Possibly, the easiest way for Putin to optimalize the chances of increased central European and Slavic European trust of Russia, could be to let his own power elevate even further, all the way up to a distinct (cf. 4th) branch of formal power. A branch that formally holds the power to declare states of emergency, degrees of it, or to put forth domestic ultimatums not to do so.
“One rules because of the desire to rule, the others not to be ruled: – for these it is only the lesser of two evils.” (Nietzsche, 1881: The Dawn of Day, Book 3, #181)
A superbranch of governmental power not yearning for power, preferring it if it remains merely latent, and which is so sovereign through its formally defined status that it anulls the need to defend the future state of the Russian 1993 constitution (or an overworked version of it) and its threefold power by using crude tools or means of undeclared states of emergency to underbind it in the present.
“To discern between government and people in such a way as if it here was about two separate spheres of power that negotiated and agreed, one stronger, higher with a weaker, lower, is a piece of inherited political reality perception, which still corresponds to the historical determination of power relations in the very most states. When for instance Bismarck describes the form of the constitution as a compromise between government and people, then he speaks according to a principle that has its reason in history. Contrary to this, one is now to learn according to a principle that has its origin purely in the head and which now first wants to make history, that government is nothing else than the organ of the people. Not a providing, honorable ‘above‘ relative to an ‘under‘ accustomed to humility. Before one accepts this as of now unhistorical and willed, albeit logical depiction of the term ‘government‘, should one not the least contemplate the consequences. It is so, namely, that the relationship between people and government is the strongest role modelling example, after which pattern the relationship between teacher and master, house owner and servitude, father and family, commander and soldier, master and apprentice automatically takes form. All these relationships are now developing under the reigning constitutional form of government. How, however, must they not be turned around and displaced; change name and character, when this very newest term takes in and directs people‘s heads everywhere. This will well take another century. In this, there is nothing else to wish for more than caution and slow development.” (Nietzsche, 1878, in Human, All Too Human, Part 1, #450)
This is the point at which Trump currently seems to bring the USA into historical reverse gear. Trump has even quoted Napoleon’s statement “he who saves his country does not violate any laws”. Referring to the above Nietzsche quote, Trump then appoints himself to government above the people, whereas he is popularly elected only to Government by and for the people.
One may here ask: Does he who merely thinks he saves his country violate any laws? He who merely thinks he is saving his country – based on unilateral, even personal subjectivity – does he not rather destroy it by dismembering its system of law? Napoleon overthrew the enlightenment era in France and ultimately brought French decline to the price of countless French and foreign lives. Trump makes some unfortunate picks of idols.
A different opinion about the issue on which Napoleon seems to have meant to comment on is that there exist states of emergency where laws must be suspended to save the country, but the conditions under which such states of emergency may be declared must themselves be regulated by constitutional law. Otherwise, dictator sprouts will eventually take advantage to ceize permanent power based on phony claims of emergcy (at best, emergencies they perceive honestly, but skewedly, because they are unwitting extremists).
“One may always draw a conclusion about a truly high culture, when power-mad and domineering natures only brings it (as far as) to a small and secterian impact.” (Nietzsche, 1882, in The Gay Science, Book 3, #149)
Maybe Trump sees America in an existential emergency and in need of an undeclared state of emergency. If so, he must articulate the nature of the existential American crisis he perceives much better and actually declare a state of emergency based on that explication, such as expected within long standing, experienced democracies. Otherwise, USA’s own former world of “comparable nations”; Canada and Europe, will only see a narcissistically offendable far right alpha-type who subjectively perceives a national crisis solely because of his relative perspective to the far right side of the political spectrum, now turned a dictator sprout trying to create a sense of emergency in the American populace with narratives of hostility, fake news and attacking the “democratic spatiousness” of of America’s old, long standing state-build.
“The state is a smart organization for protection of the individuals from each other. If you exaggerate its improvement, then the individual will through this at least be weakened, yes dissolved. That is, the original purpose of the state is basically thwarted.” (Nietzsche, 1878, in Human All Too Human, Part 1, #336)
“Democracy was always the form of decline of the organizational power.” (Nietzsche 1888, in Twilight of the Idols, Skirmishes of an untimely man, #39)
“The modern democracy is the historical form of the decay of the state. The outlooks that give themselves through this decay, however, are not an in every perspective unfortunate one. The smartness and self-interest of people are the best refined of all their traits, when the demands made to these forces are not corresponding to the demands of the state.” (Nietzsche, 1878, in Human All Too Human, Part 1, #472)
It – might – not be a coincidence that the Western level of economic development has historically co-incided with popular democracy. To acknowledge this, politicians in power need a broad understanding of what constitutes a nation’s strength. Diversity of creative ideas, the “setting free” of individual creativity, and the motivation that lies in potential success created by oneself creates a better pool from which to draw resources, and the allegiance to the state of this whole field can come to rely on the state being seen as the solely potent guarantist for that very freedom.
“Our modern world has an ambiguous character. The same symptoms can indicate regression or strength. The conquered authority can because of inherited (outdated) affective valuation be misunderstood as weakness. Short, the feeling as valuing affect is not on the height of time.” (Nietzsche, posthumously 1901, in The Will to Power, book 1, #110)
We don’t have to get the Russians to agree with us politically, fully trust us, or preliminary even like us. What is important is that we give them a chance to see the benefits of stable peace with us, and then all generations will have their chance to build constructively on that basis.
We should – hope – that Russia could still come to view permanent peace with stabilized borders with its European neighbors as the very same victory they could otherwise hope to secure on the battlefield, because future friendship against their prior assumption, might be possible after all – despite all subjectively held odds, so to speak. Picture for instance, the prospect of a militarily strong EU being Russia’s true friend in a war crucial to Russia’s continued existence in a far future.
We should be willing to give Russia economical advantages (“fair trade”, “privileged trade”, etc.) in return for a permanent solution that respects full autonomy of all European nations and which does not require “military fortifications” to be seen as permanently secure. This should not be seen as “buying peace”, however, but rather as an “unsecured invenstment” in peace, non-naively. It should also not be seen as a mainly “transactional form of relating” from Europe’s side. It would not be possible outside the context of a deeply intersubjective approach. It could be seen as a “transactional topping”.
Russia is part of Europe (the way some of us perceive it). We still ought not to forget the USA in this, however, and what was earlier mentioned about reciprocity for their heroic, self-sacrificial deed for us in WWII. If we take Germany, thus, their self-interest and their virtuous sides could converge in a commitment to two-front friendship, like an inverse mirror image of their historical, two-front wars. That should also be apt to reduce the need of Russia and the USA “rubbing on each other”, a permanent arrangement that could be a little part of our thanks to both as well, since “rubbing on each other” is something neither of them as of present really take interest in having to do.